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1 Introduction
We consider decision-makers facing a risky wealth prospect. The probabil-
ity distribution depends on pecuniary e¤ort, e.g., the amount invested in a
venture or prevention expenditures to protect against accidental losses. The
issue is the relation between risk aversion and the decision-makers e¤ort.
This line of inquiry has a long history.1 We review the literature most rel-
evant for our paper at the end of the introduction. Our contribution is to
characterize the necessary localor rst-orderconditions for greater risk
aversion to induce more (or less) e¤ort and to provide global conditions
ensuring that the necessary conditions are also su¢ cient.
To illustrate our approach, consider the so-called LEN model (for l inear
exponential normal, see Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). A decision-maker
can invest the amount a in a project yielding a normally distributed gross
return Y . The variance is constant and the mean is the concave function (a).
The net return is W  Y   a. As is well known, all decision-makers with
CARA utility functions invest the same amount as would a risk neutral, i.e.,
they choose aN maximizing the expected nal wealth. When the solution
is interior, it satises the rst-order condition 0(aN) = 1. However, the
same is also trivially true of all risk averse individuals. Indeed, denoting the
utility function by u(), the marginal expected utility with respect to a can
be written as
(0(a)  1)E[u0(W ) j a]:
Normally distributed gross returns with a constant variance is thus one ex-
ample of situations in which risk aversion has no e¤ect on e¤ort. The result
is trivial because the nal wealth distributions at di¤erent investment levels
1See for instance the insurance and economics of risk literature, notably Ehrlich
and Becker (1972), Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), Boyer and Dionne (1989), Briys and
Schlesinger (1990), Jullien and al. (1999). More recently Chiu (2005), Eeckhoudt and Gol-
lier (2005), and Meyer and Meyer (2011) discussed the role of prudence in self-protection
decisions.
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can be ranked on the basis of rst-order stochastic dominance.
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Figure 1. Normally distributed returns
But suppose that the amount invested also a¤ects the standard deviation
(a). The marginal expected utility is now2
(0(a)  1)E[u0(W ) j a] + 0(a)(a)E[u00(W ) j a]:
Obviously, risk neutral decision-makers continue to choose aN . This is not
so for risk averse individuals. For instance, when 0(aN) < 0, the expected
utility of a risk averse is strictly increasing in a at aN . Risk averse decision-
makers would therefore be expected to invest more. This must be so when the
situation is as represented in Figure 1. With normally distributed returns,
the nal wealth distribution at aN second-order stochastically dominates the
distributions at all a below aN . All risk averse decision-makers therefore pre-
fer aN to any a < aN . Similarly, noting that the variance is minimized at a1,
2The expected utility is
R
u(   a + z)(z) dz where (z) is the standard normal
density. The marginal expected utility is then
R
u0()[0   1 + 0z](z) dz. Noting that
z(z) =  0(z) and integrating by parts,
Z
u0()z(z) dz = E[u00 j a], which yields the
second term.
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the distribution at a1 second-order stochastically dominates the distributions
at a > a1. Thus, all risk averse decision-makers will choose an action in the
open interval (aN ; a1). The set of second-degree undominated actions is the
thick interval in the gure.
One can go a step further. Suppose some ba is optimal for a particular risk
averse. Because 0(ba) < 0, one can show that the expected utility of a more
risk averse is then increasing at ba (and decreasing for a less risk averse). A
more risk averse will then invest more than ba. The result follows because,
with (a) concave and (a) convex as represented in Figure 1, expected
utility can be shown to be concave in the amount invested.3 Altogether, we
therefore have a situation where, given the action ba chosen by some decision-
maker, the choices of more or less averse decision-makers can be predicted
solely on the basis of the sign of 0(ba), i.e., depending on whether risk is
locallyincreasing or decreasing with the amount invested.
Suppose, however, that the situation is as represented in Figure 2. Now
(a) reaches a maximum at a0 > aN and a minimum at a1 > a0. A risk
neutral continues to choose aN . Because 0(aN) > 0, a slightly risk averse will
choose to invest an amount slightly below aN . A somewhat more risk averse
than the latter individual would invest an even smaller amount. However, a
very risk averse decision-maker will invest more than aN , e.g., he will prefer an
action just slightly below a1. The expected nal wealth is then signicantly
smaller but the risk is su¢ ciently reduced to make this worthwhile for a
very risk averse. In the situation described by Figure 2, expected utility will
generally not be concave in a. Indeed, the set of second-degree undominated
actions is the union of the two disjoint thick intervals represented in the
gure.4 The example illustrates the following related points. First, when
3Di¤erentiate expected utility once more with respect to a and use the same argument
as in footnote 2. See section 4 for a more general proof in the case where variables are not
normally distributed.
4For any a not in this set, there is a0 yielding a net return with larger mean and smaller
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expected utility cannot be guaranteed to be concave or quasiconcave, the
direction of local changes in risk will not allow any rm prediction about
the actions chosen by more (or less) risk averse decision decision-makers.
Secondly, there are then no general conditions ensuring a monotonic relation
between action and risk aversion.
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Figure 2. Non convex (a)
This paper provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for generalizing
to arbitrary distributions the kind of results illustrated in Figure 1. Supposeba is the optimal action of some decision-maker. We rst ask whether di¤er-
ently risk averse decision-makers would gain by marginally deviating from ba?
This yields localor rst-orderconditions on the distribution of returns
for risk aversion to be either locally incentive-neutral, incentive-increasing or
decreasing. Next we look at the global maxima of individuals with a utility
function di¤ering from that of the reference individual. We show that our
localconditions for characterizing the relation between risk aversion and
action are necessary for the same relation to hold with respect to global max-
ima. Specically, for all more risk averse to invest more than ba, it must be
variance.
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the case that expected utility is increasing in a at ba for all more risk averse.
It follows that, if expected utility is concave in a, the localnecessary con-
ditions are also su¢ cient for all more risk averse to invest more. We provide
conditions for the decision-makersproblem to be concave. The conditions
are shown that to bear no particular relation with how risk varies aroundba. Hence the concavity condition can be combined with localconditions
ensuring that greater risk aversion is either incentive increasing or decreasing.
In a seminal paper, Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) introduced the notion of
mean utility preserving increase (or decrease) in risk. They use the concept to
analyze the e¤ect of risk aversion on behavior in various contexts. Applied to
a problem such as ours, their analysis is purely in terms of local comparative
statics results: given the action chosen by some reference decision-maker, a
marginally more risk averse individual gains by investing marginally more
(or less). This sides step the di¢ culties raised in the example illustrated in
Figure 2. By contrast, we obtain the same condition as Diamond and Stiglitz
as a necessary condition for all more risk averse to invest more. Next we
provide conditions ensuring that the local characterization of changes in risk
is su¢ cient to predict global optima. An important feature, as mentioned
above, is that the global conditions have no bearing on local changes in risk.
The analogy with the example of Figure 1 is that the conditions 00  0 and
00  0 imply nothing concerning the sign of 0(ba).
Another important contribution is Jewitts (1989) notion of location inde-
pendent risk. The notion is important because it can be used to characterize
the dispersionof gross returns independently of the amount invested (or of
the individuals initial wealth). Applied to our problem, one can show that
a su¢ cient condition for a monotonic relation between risk aversion and ac-
tion is that location independent risk be monotonic in the amount invested.
However, the assumption of overall monotonicity would not t the example
illustrated by Figure 1 where risk is rst decreasing then increasing. Both the
notions of mean utility preserving increase in risk and location independent
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risk nevertheless play an important role in our analysis as a characterization
of local changes in risk.
Section 2 sets out the decision problem and reviews notions of risk and
dispersion. Section 3 derives the necessary condition. Section 4 compares
global optima and presents examples. Section 5 applies the results to incen-
tives in the principal-agent model when e¤ort has a money cost. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Set-up
Individuals invest a 2 [0; a] in a prospect yielding the gross return y, so that
nal wealth is w = y   a. Returns are realized according to the distribution
G(y j a), where G is twice-continuously di¤erentiable with density denoted
by g. For all a, the support is contained in Y  [y; y], where the bounds
need not be nite. Utility functions are strictly increasing in nal wealth,
concave, and twice-continuously di¤erentiable. We denote by U the set of all
such utility functions dened over [w;w]  [y   a; y].
Individuals will be referred to by their utility function in U. We write
utility functions as lower-case letters and use the corresponding upper case
for the expected utility. For decision-maker u, the expected utility from
investing a is
U(a) 
Z y
y
u (y   a) g(y j a) dy: (1)
We consider distributions of returns such that (1) exists.
Our purpose is to compare the choices of decision-makers who di¤er in
risk aversion, including risk neutrality as a limiting case. Individual v is more
risk averse than individual u if v is a nondecreasing concave transformation
of u or equivalently
 v00(w)
v0(w)
  u
00(w)
u0(w)
for all w. (2)
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Note that di¤erences in risk aversion may be due to di¤erences in wealth,
e.g., one could write u(y   a)   (wu0 + y   a) where wu0 is individual us
initial wealth.
Various notions of risk and stochastic orders will prove useful. Diamond
and Stiglitz (1974) mean utility preserving increase in risk, hereafter DS-
riskiness, is dened with respect to a reference individual. Denote the dis-
tribution of nal wealth by H(w j a), so that H(w j a)  G(w + a j a).
Distributions can be thought of as being indexed by a. By denition, a2 is
DS-riskier than a1 with respect to the utility u if individual u is indi¤erent
between a1 and a2 while all individuals more risk averse than u prefer a1.
This property is equivalent to
wZ
w
u0()H( j a1) d 
wZ
w
u0()H( j a2) d for all w; (3)
wZ
w
u0()H( j a1) d =
wZ
w
u0()H( j a2) d: (4)
When the reference individual is risk neutral so that u0 is constant, (3) and (4)
imply that a2 is a mean preserving spread of a1. With u0 constant, condition
(3) on its own means that a1 second-degree stochastically dominates a2. All
risk averse individuals then prefer a1 (at least weakly) and so does a risk
neutral.
Jewitt(1989) location independent risk, hereafter J-dispersion, does not
rely on a reference individual. It ranks distributions independently of hor-
izontal shifts in the distributions.5 The notion generalizes the idea that a
normally distributed variable is more risky than another if it has a larger
variance, irrespective of the means. J-dispersion can therefore be applied di-
rectly to gross returns. The distribution of returns a2 has more J-dispersion
5On these notions, see also Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) and Chateauneuf et al.
(2004).
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than a1 if
Q(p;a1)Z
y
G(y j a1) dy 
Q(p;a2)Z
y
G(y j a2) dy for all p 2 (0; 1), (5)
where Q(p; a) denotes the quantile function associated with G(y j a), i.e.,
Q(p; a) is the p-percentile gross return. Because our cumulative distributions
are strictly increasing in y, the quantile is simply the inverse function dened
by
G(Q(p; a) j a)  p for all p 2 (0; 1): (6)
Using the change of variable y = Q(p; a) and integrating by parts, condition
(5) can be rewritten as
pZ
0
Qp(; a1) d 
pZ
0
Qp(; a2) d for all p 2 (0; 1): (7)
We will also sometimes refer to the following stronger condition. The
distribution of returns a2 is more dispersed than a1 in the sense of Bickel and
Lehmann (1979), hereafter BL-dispersion, when Q(p; a2)   Q(p; a1) is non
decreasing in p, i.e., when
Qp(p; a1)  Qp(p; a2) for all p 2 (0; 1): (8)
Obviously, (8) implies 7.
Finally, it will also be useful to express the condition of second-degree
stochastic dominance in terms of quantiles (see Levy 1992). The quantile
function of nal wealth is Q(p; a)   a. The distribution a1 second-degree
dominates a2 if
pZ
0
(Q(; a1)  a1) d 
pZ
0
(Q(; a2)  a2) d for all p 2 (0; 1): (9)
8
3 Necessary conditions
Decision-makers choose a to maximize expected utility. An interior maximum
for individual u satises the rst-order condition
U 0(a) =  
Z y
y
u0 (y   a) (Ga(y j a) + g(y j a)) dy = 0: (10)
We assume throughout that maxima are interior. We rst analyze necessary
conditions for all more risk averse individuals to invest more (or less) than
some reference decision-maker.
Local incentives. The necessary conditions are in terms of local in-
centives, by which me mean what happens in the neighborhood of some
action.
Denition 1 Let U 0(au) = 0 for decision-maker u. Risk aversion is (i)
incentive-neutral at au if V 0(au) = 0 for all v; (ii) incentive-increasing (resp.
decreasing) at au if V 0(au)  0 (resp.  0) for all v more risk averse than u,
with strict inequalities for some v.
Incentive-neutrality means that, if au is a stationary point for individual
u, then the same is true for all decision-makers irrespective of their degree of
risk aversion. Risk aversion is incentive-increasing when all more risk averse
decision-makers weakly prefer to marginally increase their investment above
au and some strictly so.
Proposition 1 Let U 0(au) = 0 for decision-maker u. Risk aversion is
(i) incentive-neutral at au if and only if
Ga(y j au) + g(y j au) = 0, for all y 2 Y; (11)
(ii) incentive-increasing at au if and only if, with strict inequalities over some
interval,Z y
y
u0(   au) (Ga( j au) + g( j au)) d  0 for all y 2 Y, (12)
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and is incentive-decreasing when the reversed inequalities hold.
When au is in fact optimal for individual u, condition (11) is necessary
for all individuals to also want to choose au. It turns out that the local
condition (12) is itself necessary for the optimal choice of all more risk averse
individuals to be above au.
Proposition 2 Let au and av be optimal for the individuals u and v respec-
tively. If av = au for all v, then (11) holds. If av  au for all v more risk
averse than u, then (12) holds; if av  au for all v more risk averse than u,
the reverse inequalities hold.
The second part of the proposition rules out the possibility that a decision-
maker would prefer to marginally decrease his investment below au while
his global maximum is in fact above au. Slightly di¤erent individuals can
be expected to make only slightly di¤erent choices, i.e., there will be some
whose best action is arbitrarily close to au. For all decision-makers more
risk averse than u to invest more than au therefore requires the expected
utilities of slightly di¤erent decision-makers to be non-decreasing at au. The
proposition shows that the same must in fact be true for all more risk averse
decision-makers.6
Local changes in risk and dispersion. We now interpret our necessary
conditions in terms of risk and dispersion. Proposition 2 imposes conditions
on the distribution of nal wealth, which we denoted H(w j a). Consider
rst the case where all individuals in U optimally choose au. It must then be
6We focused on more risk averse decision-makers when (12) or the reverse inequalities
hold. Because the condition is necessary and su¢ cient for risk aversion to be locally in-
creasing (or decreasing), the implications for less risk averse decision-makers are perfectly
symmetrical.
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that au second-degree stochastically dominates all a. This requires
wZ
w
H( j au) d 
wZ
w
H( j a) d for all w and a.
The expression on the right-hand side is therefore minimized at au, for all w.
Because the minimum is interior, the necessary rst-order condition is
wZ
w
Ha( j a) d = 0 for all w.
Di¤erentiating with respect to w then yields Ha(w j au) = 0 for all w.
Condition (11) follows by noting that
Ha(y   a j a)  Ga(y j a) + g(y j a):
Thus, (11) is the rst-order condition for second-degree stochastic dominance
at au.
It may be remarked that (11) is also the rst-order condition for rst-
degree stochastic dominance at au. The requirement is then H(w j au) 
H(w j a) for all a and w, which again implies Ha(w j au) = 0 for all w.
Obviously, if there exists a rst-degree dominant action, it will also be second-
degree dominant. In the case of normally distributed returns represented in
Figure 1, aN is second-degree dominant when (a) also reaches its minimum
at aN (i.e., when a1 = aN). However, unless (a) is constant, there is then
no rst-degree dominant action.
Consider now condition (12) when au is optimal for u. In terms of the
distribution of nal wealth at au and au+", where " is positive but negligible,
wZ
w
u0() (H( j au + ") H( j au)) d ' "
wZ
 1
u0()Ha( j au) d:
Because decision-maker us expected utility is maximized at au, a small
change has only second-order e¤ects, i.e., the right-hand side vanishes at
11
w = w. Given condition (12), however, the right-hand side is non positive
for all w  w when " > 0. The condition therefore states that a marginally
larger investment level is DS-less risky than au with respect to u. Hence, it
is preferred by decision-makers more risk averse than u.
We now turn to the notions of dispersion introduced in section 2. These
can be dened in the neighborhood of a given action, noting that for " arbi-
trarily small Qp(p; a+ ") Qp(p; a) ' "Qap(p; a):
Denition 2 BL-dispersion is locally decreasing in a if Qap(p; a)  0 for all
p. J-dispersion is locally decreasing in a if
R p
0
Qap(; a) d  0 for all p.
Dispersion is stationary if the equalities hold for all p.
From (6), it is easily seen that Qp(p; a) = g(Q(p; a) j a) 1 and
Qa(p; a) =  Ga(Q(p; a) j a)
g(Q(p; a) j a) for p 2 (0; 1):
Condition (11) is therefore equivalent to Qa(p; au) = 1 for all p. It follows
that Qap(p; au) = 0 for all p, i.e., condition (11) implies that dispersion is
stationary at au.
BL-dispersion decreasing at au implies (12). To see this, write expected
utility in terms of the quantile function,
U(a) =
Z 1
0
u(Q(p; a)  a) dp: (13)
Expected utility is stationary at au when
U 0(au) =
Z 1
0
u0 (y   au) (Qa(p; au)  1) dp = 0: (14)
Similarly, (12) can be rewritten asZ p
0
u0 (y   au) (Qa(; au)  1) d  0 for p 2 (0; 1): (15)
Given condition (14), Qa(p; au)  1 cannot be always positive or always neg-
ative. When Qap(p; au)  0 for all p, the expression is nonincreasing in p
12
and must therefore change from positive to negative. Hence, BL-dispersion
decreasing at au implies (15). We show that J-dispersion decreasing at au
also implies (15).
Corollary 1 Given U 0(au) = 0, condition (11) is equivalent to dispersion
being stationary at au; J-dispersion decreasing at au implies condition (12):
Discussion. When u optimally chooses au, condition (12) is necessary for
all individuals more risk averse than u to invest more than au. However, the
condition is not su¢ cient by itself to predict global optima, unless expected
utility can be guaranteed to be concave or pseudoconcave in the amount
invested.7 The next section will provide su¢ cient conditions.
Even when one abstracts from these issues, it should be emphasized that
a condition such as (12) does not yield an overall monotonic relation between
optimal actions and risk aversion. Specically, it may well be that some other
individual v, who cannot be ranked in terms of risk aversion with respect to
u, also optimally chooses au. For individual v, the equivalent of condition
(12) may not hold, even though it holds for u. Hence, because the condition
is necessary to allow predictions, there will be some individuals more risk
averse than v who will invest less than v and some who will invest more.
We briey discuss the implications of overall monotonicity between action
and risk aversion. Let A  fa j a 2 argmaxa0 U(a0), u 2 Ug. When A is
not a singleton, it is the set of actions which cannot be ranked by second-
degree stochastic dominance. In other words, any action in this set is some
individuals optimal choice. An example is the interval [aN ; a1) in Figure 1
for the case of normally distributed returns.
Corollary 2 Let au and av denote the optimal actions for u and v respec-
tively. If A is convex and av  au for all u, v 2 U with v more risk averse
7A continuously di¤erentiable quasiconcave function is pseudoconcave if a vanishing
derivative implies a maximum (rather than an inection point or a at section).
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than u (alternatively av  au), then U(a) is quasiconcave over A for all
u 2 U.
Figure 4 provides an illustration. The set A is the interval from al to ah.
According to the corollary, each decision-makersexpected utility is single-
peaked over the set of relevant actions. This follows from Proposition 2. In
the gure, v is more risk averse than u and av > au. Hence, vs expected
utility is non-decreasing at au. But the same is also true for all a < av because
any such a is chosen by some less risk averse than v. A similar argument
shows that vs expected utility is everywhere non-increasing to the right of
av (see the Appendix for the details).
Overall monotonicity requires strong conditions onG. In the next section,
we do not impose such strong conditions. Our focus is the use of the local
conditions of Proposition 1 for predicting behavior.
a
ua
U
)(aU
1a va hala 2a
)(aV
Figure 3. Monotonicity and quasiconcavity
4 Local incentives as su¢ cient conditions
Given the action optimally chosen by individual u, the conditions of Proposi-
tion 1 are su¢ cient for predicting the choices of more (or less) averse decision-
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makers if expected utility is concave in e¤ort for all decision-makers. Recall-
ing the quantile expression for expected utility in (13), a straightforward
su¢ cient condition is the concavity in a of the quantile function Q(p; a),
equivalently G(y j a) quasiconvex in y and a. A weaker condition is Concav-
ity of the Cumulative Quantile (CCQ) as dened in Fagart and Fluet (2013).
They show that the condition is su¢ cient for expected utility to be concave
in a for all risk averse (or risk neutral) decision-makers.
Denition 3 The distribution G(y j a) satises CCQ if R p
0
Q(; a) d is con-
cave in a for all p, equivalently if
R y
y
G( j a) d is convex in (y; a).
When the gross return distribution satises CCQ, condition (11) implies
that all decision-makers also choose au; condition (12) implies that all more
risk averse decision-makers invest more than au. We discuss two examples
illustrating how quantile concavity or the weaker CCQ combine with local
changes in dispersion.
Multiplicative-additive risk model. Let the gross return be a linear
function of some random state, i.e., y = (a) + (a)z where (a) > 0 and
z is the realization of the random variable Z which does not depend on a.
This generalizes the case of normally distributed returns discussed in the
introduction. Without loss of generality, we can take Z to have zero mean
and unit variance, hence (a) and (a) are respectively the mean and the
standard deviation of returns.
Let QZ(p) denote the quantile function of Z. The zero mean condition isR 1
0
QZ(p) dp = 0. The gross return quantile is
Q(p; a) = (a) + (a)QZ(p):
We assume 00(a)  0 and 00(a)  0. These conditions guarantee that the
distribution of returns satisfy CCQ: for all p,Z p
0
Qaa(; a) d = p
00(a) + 00(a)
Z p
0
QZ() d  0:
15
The integral on the right-hand side is negative because it has the same sign
as the mean of the distribution truncated from the right.
Let au be individual us optimal action. Recalling the quantile formula-
tion of second-degree stochastic dominance in (9), observe thatZ p
0
(Qa(; au)  1) d = p (0(au)  1) + 0(au)
Z p
0
QZ() d
cannot be positive (or negative) for all p. If it were, a marginal variation
from au would second-degree dominate, contradicting the statement that au
is optimal.
There are therefore three possibilities. The rst is 0(au) 1 = 0(au) = 0,
implying that expected nal wealth is maximized and that its variance is
minimized. Noting that Qap(p; a) = 0(a)Q0Z(p), this possibility corresponds
to the case where condition (11) holds and dispersion is stationary at au.
The action au is then second-degree dominant and all decision-makers also
choose au.
The two other possibilities are either 0(au) > 1 together with 0(au) > 0
or 0(au) < 1 together with 0(au) < 0. When 0(au) < 0, BL-dispersion is
decreasing at au. Individual u invests more than the amount that would max-
imize expected wealth because this allows him to purchaseless dispersion.
Condition (12) then holds, implying that more risk averse decision-makers
will invest even more than u. When 0(au) > 0, BL-dispersion is increasing
at au. Individual u invests less than the the amount maximizing expected
wealth because this would come at the cost of too much dispersion. More
risk averse individuals will then invest even less.
Stochastic production function. Consider now a general stochastic
production function with a as input, y = '(a; z) where 'a > 0, 'aa < 0
and 'z > 0, i.e., large values of z correspond to more favorable states of
Nature. The gross return quantile is then Q(p; a) = '(a;QZ(p)). Concavity
in a follows from the concavity of the production function, hence expected
utility is concave in a. Note that Qap(p; a) = 'az(a;QZ(p))Q
0
Z(p).
16
Suppose decision-maker u optimally chooses au. If 'az(au; z) < 0 in all
states of Nature, BL-dispersion is decreasing at au. Individuals more risk
averse than u invest more because the marginal product of investment is
relatively larger in unfavorable states of Nature.8 More risk averse individuals
are more willing than u to trade o¤ a smaller net wealth in favorable states
against a larger net wealth in unfavorable ones. Conversely, if 'az(au; z) > 0
in all states, BL-dispersion is increasing at au and more risk averse individuals
invest less than u.
A more general case is to allow 'az(au; z) to change sign. For instance, it
may be that the marginal product 'a is below average when Nature is either
very harsh or very generous; conversely that it is above average in extreme
conditions, whether favorable or unfavorable. J-dispersion is decreasing at
au if Z p
0
'az(au; QZ())Q
0
Z() d  0 for all p:
Integrating by parts, this can be rewritten as
'a(au; QZ(p)) 
1
p
Z p
0
'a(au; QZ()) d for all p: (16)
The expression on the right-hand side is the average marginal product below
the p-percentile. Condition (16) is equivalent to
d
dp

1
p
Z p
0
'a(au; QZ()) d

 0 for all p:
In words, J-dispersion is decreasing at au when the marginal product is on
average larger in unfavorable states. Individuals more risk averse than u then
invest more.
First versus second-degree stochastic dominance. When disper-
sion is stationary at some given action and the distribution of returns satises
8This is essentially the case discussed in Jullien et al. (1999). Their Propositions 5 and
6 are both equivalent to the condition that BL-dispersion is decreasing at all a. Observe
that 'az(au; z) < 0 for all z only means that BL-dispersion is locally decreasing at au.
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CQC, all risk averse or risk neutral decision-makers optimally choose that
action. In other words, the local condition (11) is then both necessary and
su¢ cient for the action to be second-degree dominant. In some cases the
action may also be rst-degree dominant and will be so if a rst-degree dom-
inant action exists.
In section 3, we remarked that the same condition (11) was also necessary
for rst-degree stochastic dominance at the action considered. Are there con-
ditions that would allow us to infer rst-degree stochastic dominance when
(11) holds? For this purpose, we consider an alternative characterization of
decreasing returns to investment. The condition will be referred to Isoprob-
ability Convexity of the Distribution Function (ICDF).
Denition 4 The distribution of returns satises ICDF if Ga(Q(p; a) j a) is
nondecreasing in a for all p and a.
The condition evokes the well known Convexity of the Distribution Func-
tion Condition (CDFC) dened by Ga(y j a) nondecreasing in a for all y.
However, ICDF looks at convexity for given probability levels. When a
larger a increases returns in the sense of rst degree stochastic dominance,
 Ga(y j a) is the marginal productivity in terms of reducing the proba-
bility of outcomes worse than y. Similarly,  Ga(Q(p; a) j a) is the p-level
marginal productivity. ICDF imposes that p-levels marginal returns be de-
creasing. The condition is easily shown to be equivalent to Ga(y j a)=g(y j a)
nondecreasing in a.
Corollary 3 Suppose U 0(au) = 0 and dispersion is stationary at au. If the
distribution of returns satises CCQ, au is second-degree stochastically dom-
inant. If it satises ICDF, au is rst-degree dominant.
When dispersion is stationary at au, ICDF ensures that the net return
quantile, Q(p; a)   a, is nondecreasing in a for a < au and nonincreasing
otherwise; that is, the net return quantile is quasiconcave and reaches a
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maximum at au for all p. Hence au is rst-degree dominant.9 There is some
overlap between CCQ and ICDF. For instance, Ga always nonpositive, ICDF
and BL-dispersion everywhere nonincreasing can be shown to imply CCQ.10
5 An application to incentive schemes
We apply the preceding results to incentives in the principal-agent frame-
work with moral hazard. E¤ort is pecuniary, i.e., an unveriable monetary
expenditure. The principal faces many di¤erent agents and is constrained to
use the same performance scheme with all of them. The issue is how agents
with di¤erent risk preferences react to the same monetary incentives.
The wage or payment depends on the signal X, e.g., the agents output
or a purely informative performance index. The cdf is denoted 	(x j a), the
corresponding density is  (x j a) with a support X  [x; x] that is invariant
with respect to e¤ort. We make the usual assumptions that 	 is twice
continuously di¤erentiable and satises MLRP with  a= strictly increasing
in x so that 	a < 0. Given an increasing wage scheme, the marginal gross
return of e¤ort is positive in the sense of rst degree stochastic dominance.
We show that the e¤ect of risk aversion depends on the curvature of the
payment scheme, where curvature is in terms of an appropriate transforma-
tion of the signal. Loosely speaking, when the wage scheme is concave,
risk aversion will be incentive increasing; it will be incentive decreasing when
the scheme is convex.
For some e¤ort level ba, consider the transformed signal Z dened by
z = '(x)   
xZ
xc
 ( j ba)
	a( j ba) d, x 2 X; (17)
9The reverse condition, Ga(Q(p; a) j a) nonincreasing in e¤ort, would imply that the
expected utility reaches a global minimum when dispersion is stationary at au.
10MLRP (i.e., ga=g increasing in y), ICDF and Jewitt-dispersion everywhere decreasing
implies CCQ.
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where xc is some arbitrary threshold of the original signal. Denote the sup-
port of the transformed signal by Z  [z; z]. Because ' is a strictly increasing
function, Z also satises MLRP and delivers the same information as X with
respect to a. Hence, any wage scheme dened with respect to the original
signal can be replicated as a scheme dened with respect to the transformed
signal. We henceforth focus on the latter and represent a wage scheme by a
function y = y(z).
As a rst observation, under a scheme of the form y(z) = z, risk aversion
is incentive-neutral at ba. To see this, observe that the resulting random wage
is distributed according to the cdf F (z j a) = 	(' 1(z) j a) with density
f(z j a) =  (' 1(z) j a)d' 1(z)=dz. Noting that
d' 1(z)
dz
=  	a('
 1(z) j ba)
 (' 1(z) j ba) ;
it follows that Fa(z j ba) + f(z j ba) = 0 for all z, i.e., condition (11) of
Proposition 1 holds at ba. The same would be true of any linear scheme
y(z) = z + k where k is an arbitrary constant. We now look at the e¤ects of
non linearity.
Corollary 4 Under the wage scheme y(z), BL-dispersion is decreasing at ba
if and only if y00(z)  0 for all z. J-dispersion is decreasing at ba if and only
if E[y0(Z) j Z  z;ba] is decreasing in z for all z:
Decreasing BL-dispersion at ba is equivalent to the concavity of the pay-
ment scheme compared to the linear benchmark. Under concave schemes,
a marginal increase in e¤ort above ba reduces the riskiness of the wage dis-
tribution; the opposite occurs with convex schemes. The interpretation with
respect to J-dispersion is similar. J-dispersion is decreasing at ba when the
scheme is concave on average, i.e., the slope of the wage function is on
average larger at the bottom the distribution. The intuition is that whether
risk aversion is incentive increasing or decreasing depends on the location of
incentives with respect to realizations of the signal.
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We now provide a characterization in terms of condition (12) of Proposi-
tion 1.
Corollary 5 Suppose U 0(ba) = 0 under the scheme y(z) and dene fu(z) 
u0(y(z)  ba)f(z j ba). ThenZ z
z
(y0(z)  1)fu(z) dz = 0 (18)
and risk aversion is incentive increasing at ba if and only if
zZ
z
(y0()  1)fu() d  0 for all z. (19)
The function fu(z) can be interpreted as a density because utility func-
tions are arbitrary up to an increasing linear transformation. Condition (19)
describes a scheme tilted towards penalizing the agent for bad performance
rather than rewarding him for good performance.
When u is risk neutral, fu(z)  f(z j ba). The conditions (18) and (19)
then reduce to
E[y0(Z) j ba] = 1; (20)
E[y0(Z) j Z  z; ba]  1 for all z: (21)
A risk neutral agent is motivated only by the overall expectation of the slope.
He is indi¤erent to whether the slope is on average greater at the bottom or
at the top of the distribution. This is not so for a risk averse agent. Given
(21), the expected utility of a risk averse is increasing at ba: exerting more
e¤ort yields a mean preserving contraction in the agents random wage. The
opposite obtains when the inequalities are reversed. When agent u is himself
risk averse, condition (19) together with (18) imply that the density fu puts
greater weight on bad outcomes compared to good ones. A more risk averse
agent would put even greater weight on bad outcomes.
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Figure 4. A penalty oriented scheme
Figure 4 provides an illustration. In the gure, y0(z)   1 is rst positive
then negative as z increases. The single-crossing property implies that, if
(20) holds, then (21) must also hold. Similarly, if (18) holds, then so must
(19).
Because a risk averse agent is sensitive to the location of the incentives,
it is possible to induce e¤ort with a scheme that is not very steep overall,
provided it has su¢ cient power in the lower tail. The more risk averse
the agent, the more the slope in the lower tail will matter compared to that
in the upper tail. Therefore, depending on the location of incentives, wages
that provide risk neutral agents with relatively weak incentives may provide
strong incentives for risk averse ones. Conversely, a reward-oriented scheme
that provides good incentives for a risk neutral may work poorly with risk
averse individuals.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We derived necessary local conditions on the probability distributions for
greater risk aversion to be incentive neutral, incentive-increasing or decreas-
ing. Combined with conditions ensuring that the decision problems are con-
cave, the local conditions are su¢ cient for comparing the choices of di¤er-
entially risk averse decision-makers. Because the conditions are necessary,
it follows that, when they do not hold, choices cannot be compared on the
basis of risk aversion alone. It may be possible, nevertheless, to make pre-
dictions for a restricted class of utility functions, e.g., functions exhibiting
positive prudence or downside risk aversion. A rst step in this direction
was recently taken by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) and Chiu (2005). An
interesting extension of the present paper would be to look for necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for comparing the choices of decision-makers ordered in
terms of downside risk aversion as dened in Keenan and Snow (2009).
Appendix
We rst prove a preliminary result.
Lemma 1 Let  be a piecewise continuous integrable function on Y = [y; y].
The inequality L() =
R
Y (y)(y) dy  0 holds for all continuous non nega-
tive functions  if and only if (y)  0 for all y 2 Y:
Proof. Su¢ ciency is obvious. To show necessity, choose y1 < y2 in Y and "
such that 0 < " <
y2   y1
2
. Dene
"(y) = 0 if y =2 [y1; y2];
=
y   y1
"
if y 2 [y1; y1 + ");
= 1 if y 2 [y1 + "; y2   ");
=
y2   y
"
if y 2 [y2   "; y2]:
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Observe that "(y) is non negative and continuous. Moreover,
lim
"!0
L(") =
y2Z
y1
(y) dy  0;
where the inequality follows by continuity. As a consequence, there exists
no interval (y1; y2) such that (t) < 0 for all t 2 (y1; y2). Because (y) is
continuous on appropriate intervals, (y)  0 for all y 2 Y.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Su¢ ciency. Di¤erentiating the decision-makers expected utility with
respect to e¤ort and integrating by parts yields
U 0(a) =
Z
Y
u(y   a)ga(y j a) dy  
Z
Y
u0(y   a)g(y j a) dy
=  
Z
Y
u0(y   a)(Ga(y j a) + g(y j a)) dy:
For a = au, the su¢ ciency of (11) in part (i) is then obvious. For (ii), dene
u(y)   
Z y
y
u0(   au) (Ga( j au) + g( j au)) d; for y 2 Y: (22)
Then U 0(au) = u(y) = 0 and condition (12) requires u(y)  0 for all y.
For decision-maker v,
V 0(a) =  
Z
Y
v0(y   au)
u0(y   au)
0
u(y) dy:
Integrating by parts and using u(y) = 0 implies
V 0(au) =  
Z
Y
@
@y

v0(y   au)
u0(y   au)

u(y) dy:
When v is more risk averse than u, @(v0=u0)=@y  0 so that (12) implies
V 0(au)  0:
24
Necessity. Using the notations in lemma 1, dene
(y) = u(y);
(y) =   @
@y

v0(y   au)
u0(y   au)

;
so that V 0(au) = L(). Applying lemma 1, L()  0 for all non negative
and continuous (y) implies that (y) must be non negative. This proves the
necessity of (12) in part (ii). To prove necessity in part (i), we show that
(11) must hold if V 0(au) = 0 for all more risk averse decision-makers. The
equality is equivalent to V 0(au)  0 and V 0(au)  0. By lemma 1, the rst
inequality implies that (y) is non negative, the second that  (y) is non
negative. Therefore (y) = 0 for all y. Di¤erentiating with respect to y then
yields (11). QED
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose an interior maximum for u; in case of
multiplicity, let au be the largest one. Then U 0(au) = 0 and U(au) > U(a) for
all a > au: Suppose all decision- makers more risk averse than u invest more
and there exists one, say v, such that V 0(au) < 0. As vs expected utility is
strictly decreasing at au, there exists ba > au such that V (au) > V (a) for all
a 2 [au;ba]. Dene
(a) =
V (a)  V (au)
U(au)  U(a) for all a  ba;
 = max
a2[ba;a] (a):
Observe that (a) is continuous in [ba; a], so  exists. Moreover,  > 0. Indeed,
if   0; then V (au)  V (a) for all a 2 [au; a] and v will prefer au to any
larger a. As V 0(au) < 0, decision-maker vs best choice would then be below
au, contradicting the statement that all more risk averse choose a larger a.
Consider now a decision-maker with eu = v + u. This decision-maker is
more averse than u and eU 0(au) < 0. Moreover, eU(au)  eU(a) for all a  au.
Indeed, eU(au)  eU(a) = V (au)  V (a) +  (U(au)  U(a)) .
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When a 2 [au;ba], eU(au) eU(a) > 0 because V (au)  V (a) and U(au) > U(a).
When a  ba,
eU(au)  eU(a)  V (au)  V (a) + (a) (U(au)  U(a)) = 0;
where the last equality follows from the denition of (a). As eU 0(au) < 0
and eU(au)  eU(a) for all a  au, decision-maker eus best choice is below au,
yielding a contradiction. Thus, V 0(au)  0 is necessary for all v more risk
averse than u.
Proof of Corollary 1. The equivalence between (11) and stationary BL-
dispersion is obvious. We show that locally decreasing J-dispersion is su¢ -
cient for (12). Let u(y) be dened as in (22). Dene
bu(p)  u(Q(p; au)) = pZ
0
u0(Q(; au)  au)(Qa(; au)  1) d
and observe that u(y)  0 for all y is equivalent to bu(p)  0 for all
p 2 (0; 1): Observe that u is zero at both the lower and upper bounds of
Y, i.e., bu(0) = bu(1) = 0. It follows that bu(p) is everywhere nonnegative
if it is nonnegative at interior local extrema, i.e., at values of p satisfyingb0u(p) = 0. By continuity, such extrema necessarily exist when bu is not
constant over (0; 1). Thus
bu(p)  0 for all p 2 P ) bu(p)  0, all p 2 (0; 1)
where P  fp 2 (0; 1) j Qa(p; au) = 1g is the set of stationary points. It
therefore su¢ ces to show that decreasing J-dispersion implies that bu(p) is
nonnegative at stationary points. Integrating bu(p) by parts then yields
bu(p) = u0(Q(p; au)  au)b(p)  yZ
y
u00(Q(; au)  au)Qp(; au)b() d;
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where b(p)  pZ
0
(Qa(; au)  1) d:
We next show that decreasing J-dispersion implies that b(p)  0 for all
p  supP. This will imply that bu(p)  0 for all p 2 P. Note that
b(p) = p (Qa(G(y; au); au)  1)  pZ
0
Qap(; au) d
=  
pZ
0
Qap(; au) d  0 when p 2 P:
The latter is non negative under decreasing J-dispersion. Because P is also
the set of stationary points of b(p), it follows that bu(p)  0 for p  supP.
QED
Proof of Corollary 2. To complete the argument in text, note that the
implications for less risk averse decision-makers (recall footnote 5). Thus, if
au  av for u less risk averse than v, then U 0(av)  0. Hence U(a) must be
nonincreasing at all a  au. QED
Proof of Corollary 3. The argument in the text shows that au is second-
degree dominant under CCQ. For any individual v, V 0(a) can be rewritten
as
V 0(a) =  
Z
Y
v0(y   a)

Ga(y j a)
g(y j a) + 1

g(y j a) dy:
Under ICDF, Ga(y j a)=g(y j a) is nonincreasing in a, so that V 0(a)  
v(a)
if and only if a  au, where

v(a)   
Z
Y
v0(y   a)

Ga(y j au)
g(y j au) + 1

g(y j a) dy:
When Ga(y j au)+g(y j au) = 0 for all y, hence 
v(a) = 0 for all a. It follows
V (a) reaches a maximum at au. QED
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Proof of Corollary 4. Denote by QZ(p; a) the quantile for the random
variable Z. For the wage y(z), the quantile is then Q(p; a) = y(QZ(p; a)).
Therefore
Qap(p; a) = y
00(QZ(p; a))QZa (p; a)Q
Z
p (p; a) + y
0(QZ(p; a))QZap(p; a):
By construction of the signal Z, QZap(p;ba) = 0 for all p and QZa (p;ba) = 1. We
thus have:
Qap(G(z j ba);ba)  0, y00(z)  0:
For J-dispersion, a similar argument shows that
pZ
0
pQap(;ba) d = pZ
0
p
 
y00(QZ(;ba))QZp (;ba) d
= py0(QZ(p;ba))  pZ
0
y0(QZ(;ba)) d:
Hence
F (zjba)Z
0
pQap(p;ba) dp  0, E[y0(Z) j Z  z;ba]  y0(z):
The latter is easily shown to be equivalent to E[y0(Z) j Z  z;ba] nonincreas-
ing in z as
E[y0(Z) j Z  z;ba] =
Z F (zjba)
0
y0(QZ(;ba)) d
F (z j ba) .
QED.
Proof of Corollary 5. Under the scheme y(z), G(y(z) j a) = F (z j a) so
y0Z
y
u0(   a)(Ga( j ba) + g( j ba)) d = y
 1(y0)Z
z
u0(y(z)  a)(y0(z)Fa( j ba) + f(z j ba)) dz
=  
y 1(y0)Z
z
u0(y(z)  a)(y0(z)  1)f(z j ba)) dz;
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noting that by construction Fa(z j ba) =   f(z j ba) for all z. Therefore (12)
is equivalent to (19). QED
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